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1. Introduction
Demographic changes throughout the world have led to the phenome-
non of population ageing. The proportion of old people in the population
is rising steeply – this process is already well under way in OECD count-
ries and by 2050 only Africa will still be “young” (World Bank, 1994).
While this result of improvements in medical care as well as the stan-
dard of living is impressive, it represents a substantial challenge for so-
cial security systems. In particular, increasing life expectancy and decli-
ning fertility lead to ever increasing dependency ratios1 in developed
countries, which renders their public pension schemes financially un-
sustainable.
Most public pension plans were set up or expanded on a massive scale
in the post-war era of “baby-boom” and significantly lower life expectan-
cies. These plans have been largely financed out of payroll taxes on a pay-
-as-you-go (PAYG) basis, i.e. today’s workers pay the pensions of to-
day’s retirees and these workers expect to be supported in the same man-
ner in the future. However, owing to the aforementioned demographic
developments, current workers face the prospect of being supported by
a relatively less numerous work force for a much longer period than it
was at the time these plans were introduced.2 These plans are, there-
fore, in need of reform because there is a looming possibility that they
will encounter insurmountable difficulties in meeting their future liabi-
lities.
An increasingly popular alternative to PAYG schemes are fully funded
(FF) schemes in which individuals save for their own retirement through
pension funds. Unlike PAYG plans which usually contain solidarity-based
redistributive elements, these plans are actuarially fair and, ideally, every
* Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences (jezek@mbox.fsv.cuni.cz)
I am grateful to Ondﬁej Schneider of the Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences for his
helpful comments and suggestions. I also owe thanks to Ondﬁej Kalenda of the Charles Uni-
versity, Faculty of Mathematics and Physics and to two anonymous referees. Of course, the res-
ponsibility for all errors is solely mine.
1 Defined as the number of old-age pensioners in relation to the number of working persons.
2 In the words of the French poet Paul Valery, the “future is not what it used to be”.participant is entitled to no more and no less than his/her accumulated con-
tributions plus interest.
While the average rate of return of a FF scheme equals the rate of inte-
rest, the average rate of return of a PAYG scheme equals the growth rate
of the underlying taxable wage base in the economy, which is equal to
the rate of growth of the labor force plus the rate of growth of wages (Sa-
muelson, 1958). Data from various countries indicate that if the investment
period is sufficiently long, the rate of interest on a combination of bonds
and equity generally exceeds the rate of wage growth by approximately 
2 to 3 percentage points (World Bank, 1994). Hence, given a stationary or
even declining labor force, FF schemes’ performance is superior to that of
mature PAYG schemes today.
By and large, both schemes have their pros and cons.3 Most importantly,
they are subject to different kinds of risk. Funded schemes are exposed
to investment risk.4 In contrast, public pension schemes are susceptible
to political risk5 and labor income risk. Since those risks are unlikely to
be perfectly correlated, their combination leads to a reduction in the ove-
rall risk and this is an argument for introducing a pension scheme com-
prising both PAYG and FF plans. While the PAYG plan possesses a uni-
que potential to redistribute income towards persons in need,6 the FF plan
limits the government’s upper hand over the economy and rewards res-
ponsible behavior.7 Countries throughout the world have contemplated at
least a partial shift towards funded schemes,8 but the cost of such a tran-
sition poses a barrier to any major reform. This is due to the fact that
the government must continue to honor its obligations to pay pension be-
nefits to current and some future pensioners long after part or all of
the stream of PAYG contributions ceases, and the accumulated implicit
debts of these pension plans are substantial.9 Also, such a complex reform
requires adequate supervision and regulation of the capital market, pen-
sion funds and insurance companies in order to mitigate the risks asso-
ciated with investment-based pension plans. If, however, the transition is
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3 See e.g. the debate in (Holzmann – Stiglitz, 2001).
4 Disney et al. (1999) add that “an additional risk arises from annuitization [...] if there is sub-
stantial uncertainty as to expected mortality improvement” (p. 22).
5 “Not one public defined benefit scheme has held to the same benefit formula over lifetimes of
a cohort of members.” (World Bank, 1994, p.112)
6 As implied earlier, a high performance of the PAYG scheme could theoretically be su-
stained through a continual growth in the population of contributors. In his often quoted
Newsweek editorial, Paul Samuelson referred to this as “the greatest Ponzi game ever con-
trived” (Samuelson, 1967, p. 88). Once a baby boom is followed by a baby bust, however, tra-
ditional defined benefit PAYG schemes find themselves in trouble if their generous promises
are to be kept. A well-designed notional defined contribution PAYG plan establishing a perfect
link between contributions and benefits (i.e. generally neither intergenerational nor intrage-
nerational redistribution) can cope with demographic shocks, but the political risk still re-
mains.
7Unlike PAYG plans, FF plans do not hamper international labor mobility. See (Schneider, 1998).
8 Most countries reforming their pension systems have opted for a combination of PAYG and FF
schemes, albeit the extent of switching varies considerably from main reliance on the PAYG
scheme (Hungary and Poland) to equal weight attached to both schemes (Switzerland) to al-
most full privatization of social security (Chile and Kazakhstan).financed at least partially through taxes and is connected with restrictive
fiscal measures, national saving increases. Also, the reform may deliver
a positive externality of great importance – capital market development.
In sum, a well-defined reform may ultimately lead to higher economic
growth.10
Pension schemes must be adjusted to the demographic developments 
sooner or later and the Czech Republic will be no exception. Indeed, it is
beginning to feel the mounting demographic pressures which threaten
the stability of its public finance and a profound reform of its social secu-
rity system is becoming a necessity. Much has been written on this ubi-
quitous topic and various reform scenarios have been suggested. Some eco-
nomists oppose funded plans and believe that a parametric reform of
the PAYG scheme suffices (Rusnok, 2001), some cautiously admit gradual
introduction of a minor FF scheme while retaining reliance on the PAYG
scheme (Laursen, 2000), some prefer a combination of both schemes (Bez-
dûk, 2000) and some advocate a full switch towards a FF scheme (Schne-
ider, 1998). I believe that the pros of funded schemes significantly out-
weigh their cons and a partial shift towards a funded scheme should be
made soon. The objective of this paper is, therefore, to supplement the exis-
ting literature containing macroeconomic simulations of a pension scheme
reform with the estimates of its elementary microeconomic implications
for future retirees.
We shall attempt to demonstrate that if individuals are given the option
to switch partially into a funded scheme, an overwhelming majority of them
will do so voluntarily, thus not only increasing their own retirement income,
but also alleviating the future burden which would hamper the PAYG
scheme as currently structured. Most countries which have switched at 
least partially towards aFF scheme instituted mandatory switching for new
labor force entrants and some have done so for current workers under a cer-
tain age limit as well. However, due to redistributive streams towards low-
-income workers in PAYG schemes, such a requirement may affect the stan-
dard of living of low-income individuals in retirement. Notably, workers
with a low earning capacity are susceptible to periods of non-contribution
to pension plans, which could result in a severe reduction in their future
pension benefits should they be compelled to switch into an alternative pen-
sion plan. Therefore, we shall investigate the impact of mandatory switch-
ing on individuals with respect to their earning capacity in order to supply
recommendations for policy makers.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 models
the income of the individual over his/her lifetime and presents a general
description of the Czech public pension scheme as well as the alternative
512 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 53, 2003, ã. 11-12
9 When most PAYG systems were established or expanded amidst the post-war euphoria, the ge-
neration which had previously contributed either very little or not at all reaped a windfall in
the form of pension benefits. Analogously, if this scheme is ever to be abandoned, the “last” ge-
neration(s) must foot the bill. According to the accrued benefit obligation definition, if a PAYG
system is discontinued (i.e. no future revenues), the implicit debt of the system is the present
value of all benefit obligations accumulated until that moment minus accumulated pension re-
serves.
10 For more in the context of the Czech Republic, see e.g. (Schneider, 1998).funded scheme. Section3 details theresults of thesimulations which sought
to estimate the impact of the proposed reform on the incomes of future pen-
sioners. Section 4 gives some recommendations and concluding remarks.
2. The Model
We construct a simple model in order to simulate the microeconomic dy-
namics of the proposed pension-scheme reform. We model the microecono-
mic foundations of the Czech PAYG scheme as well as the proposed FF
scheme and focus on individual economic agents’ decisions to join an alter-
native pension system.
2.1 The Individual
An individual enters the labor force at the biological age  . To simplify
our notation, let theterm “age” denote thetime that has elapsed since thein-
dividual’s entry into the labor force, i.e. his/her biological age less  . This
terminology is adhered to from this point onwards throughout this section,
but is dropped in the sections that follow. Thus, the individual’s current age
is t, he/she expects to die at age E and, therefore, retires at age R    0, E .11
While working, the individual receives a gross real wage w(t) and after re-
tirement, he/she is entitled to real pension benefits b(t).
Notation:
g . . . national nominal wage growth rate 
s(t).   . . individual nominal wage growth rate due to the effect of human-ca-
pital accumulation as well as ageing;12 s(t) is continuous on  0, R 
  . . . consumer price inflation rate 
Hence,
dw(t)       (1 + g)(1 + s(t))
––––– =  ––––––––––––– – 1 
. w(t),    t   (0,R) (1)
dt                  1 +  
Using
(1 + g)(1 + s(t))
––––––––––––– – 1   g + s(t) –  
1 +  
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11 Sensu stricto, the worker aged R is just about to retire and does so only at the next moment
(see Figure 1).
12 This also includes wage growth with seniority due to the fact that the employee pays for on-
-the-job training by receiving a wage lower than his/her potential marginal product (i.e. with
no training) at the beginning of his/her career. According to (Becker, 1993), if the training is
employer-specific, its costs are shared by the employer and the employee. Then, there is not
only a strong incentive for the employee not to quit (and not to shirk duties for fear of dis-
missal) in order to be able to enjoy the fruits of his/her increased productivity later, but also
a good incentive for the employer not to dismiss such a specifically-trained employee, thus re-
ducing turnover costs. For empirical evidence of wage growth with seniority; see also (Topel,
1990).for values of g, s(t) and   near zero, we arrive at
dw(t) ––––– = (g + s(t) –  ) . w(t),      t   (0,R) (2)
dt 
Solving this simple differential equation, we obtain:
w(t) = w(0) . e(g- )t+ 
t
0 s(x)dx,     Dw =  0, R 13 (3)
Let w(t) be concave on  t0, R , t0    0, R).14 Then, it can be shown easily
that s(t) is decreasing on  t0, R .15
Analogously, assume that the growth rate of the individual’s pension be-
nefits is equal to that of wages in the economy. Then:
b(t) =   . w(R) . e(g– )(t–R),16 Db = (R, E  (4)
where   denotes the gross replacement ratio, i.e. the ratio of the worker’s
first benefits received upon retirement and the last pre-retirement gross
wage.
2.2 Dynamics of Wages and Benefits in the Economy
Due to the increase in the productivity of work, the average nominal wage
in the economy grows at the rate of g, as do the subsistence wage and mi-
nimum pension benefit. Formally,
wage0(time) = wage0(timet) . e(g– )(time–timet) (5)
wageMEAN(time) = wageMEAN(timet) . e(g– )(time–timet) (6)
benefit0(time) = benefit0(timet) . e(g– )(time–timet) (7)
denote thesubsistence real wage, average real wage and minimum real pen-
sion benefit, respectively. Further notation:
time . . . calendar time  
timet . . . calendar time at which the individual is aged t
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13 w’+(0) = (g + s(t) –  ) . w(0) and w’–(R) = (g + s(t) –  ) . w(R)
14 This is to approximate empirical age-earnings profiles as shown by (Becker, 1993) or (Bos-
worth et al., 1996). The latter support the view that earnings rise with age until the mid-for-
ties and then decline until retirement. However, Becker argues that this belief may be the re-
sult of an inappropriate use of cross-sectional data rather than time-series data (or from
the failure to adjust the former by the increases in wages due to economic growth), and de-
monstrates that earnings rise until retirement and “there is no systematic tendency for time-
series profiles to decline even though cross-section ones do” (p. 233).
15 For our particular choice of the functional form of s(t), see the Appendix.
16 limt→R+ b(t) =   . w(R)Figure 1 shows the system dynamics and the trajectory of the indivi-
dual’s gross income within the system.
2.3 The Czech Pay-As-You-Go Scheme
The individual’s gross wage is taxed throughout his/her working life and this
tax is called a mandatory social security contribution, part of which is paid by
the employer and part by the employee. Denote the old-age pension contribu-
tion rate as   and assume that the individual retires at age R    P, E , where
P is the pensionable age defined by law.17 Then:
lim bPAYG(t) =  PAYG . w(R) = bb(timeR) + 0.015 . R . Bc
t→R+
+ 0.06 . (R – P) . Bc
18 (8)
where  PAYG is the individual’s gross19 replacement ratio offered by the PAYG
system and bb(timeR) is the real flat component of PAYG benefits to which
every participant retiring at timeR is entitled regardless of his/her earnings
history.
Bp for  Bp   (0, p1(timeR) 
0.7 . p1(timeR) + 0.3 . Bp for  Bp   (p1(timeR), p2(timeR) 
0.7 . p1(timeR) + 0.2 . p2(timeR) + 0.1 . Bp for  Bp   (p2(timeR), +  ) (9)
is the calculation base, where
1
R wageMEAN(timeR)
Bp = –– .     w(t) . ––––––––––––––––––––––– dt (10)
       R–  wageMEAN(timeR – R + t)
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17 Strictly speaking, the law defines the pensionable biological age   + P. We ignore survivors
and disability pensions, and focus exclusively on old-age pensions.
18 As defined by law for timeP   2001.5, +  ), where benefit0(timeR) is guaranteed to every par-
ticipant. Assume that bPAYG(t) increases according to (4).
19 Unlike wages, pension benefits are tax exempt.denotes thepersonal base of assessment of theindividual,  denotes thepre-
-retirement period over which wages are included in the calculation of
the personal base of assessment,20 and parameters 0 < p1(timeR) < p2(timeR)
are the first and the second real reduction limits at timeR, respectively.
We obtain from (8) that
bb(timeR)     0.075 . R – 0.06 . P  PAYG = –––––––– + ––––––––––––––––– . Bc (11)
w(R)                   w(R)
and it follows from (3), (6) and (10) that
w(R) R
Bp = ––––– .  e t
R s(x)dxdt (12)
  R– 
Assume that an individual aged h is able to estimate the development of
his/her wages over the remaining working life. He/she expects no adjust-
ments within the current PAYG scheme except for an increase in the pen-
sionable age and the following development of PAYG parameters over time:
bb(time) = bb(timeh) . e(g– )(time–timeh) (13)
pj(time) = pj(timeh) . e(g– )(time–timeh) j = 1,2 (14)
Then, it follows from (3), (9), (11), (12), (13) and (14) that his/her estimate
of the PAYG replacement ratio is given by the following formula:
bb(timeh)                  7.5R–6P R –––––––– . e
 h
R s(x)dx + –––––––– .   e
  t
R s(x)dxdt
w(h)                         .102 R– 
for w(h)    w0(h), w1(h)  21






22.5R–18P R + ––––––––– .   e
  t
R s(x)dxdt (15)
 .103 R– 
for  w(h)   (w1(h), w2(h) 
bb(timeh) + (7.5R–6P) . (7p1(timeh) + 2p2(timeh)). 10–3
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– .
w(h)
7.5R–6P R . e
  h
R s(x)dx + –––––––– .        e
  t
R s(x)dxdt  .103 R– 
for w(h)   (w2(h)+ )
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 PAYG = where
pj(timeh) .  






It is obvious that  PAYG(w(h)) is twice continuously differentiable with
d PAYG(w(h))               d2  PAYG(w(h))
––––––––––– < 0 and –––––––––––– > 0 (17)
dw(h)                         d(w(h))2
on each of the open intervals (w0(h), w1(h)), (w1(h), w2(h)) and (w2(h), +  ).
Therefore, it is decreasing and strictly convex on those intervals. It can be
shown easily that
 PAYG(wj(h)) =    lim       PAYG(w(h))
w(h)→wj(h) +
j = 1,2 (18)
Thus, we know that  PAYG(w(h)) is continuous, decreasing and strictly qua-
siconvex on (w0(h), + ). However,
d PAYG(w(h))                     d PAYG(w(h))
lim     ––––––––––– <     lim      ––––––––––– < 0
w(h)→wj(h) + dw(h) w(h)→wj(h) – dw(h)
j = 1,2 (19)
Hence,  PAYG(w(h)) is only piecewise smooth on (w0(h), + ) with kinks at




Figure2shows thereplacement ratio theindividual is offered by thePAYG
scheme depending upon his/her last pre-retirement wage, i.e. h = R. This
is regardless of gender since the PAYG formula does not discern between
genders and as the wage level is varied, all other things are held equal, in-
cluding wage growth rates.
2.4 A Fully Funded Scheme
The individual saves for retirement in a pension fund throughout his/her
working life. Unable to foretell the exact moment of his/her death, a risk-
-averse individual can be expected to seek insurance against longevity.22
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20   = min  timeR – 1986, 30 , timeR    1996, +  ) as defined by law.
21 As noted earlier, a minimum benefit is guaranteed by law to every participant in the PAYG
scheme. Thus, let the minimum wage the individual has to receive at h in order for the formula
to apply be denoted by w0(h).
22 The personal expected length of life differs among individuals based upon their health sta-
tus, lifestyle, family-health history, etc. and the information about the remaining length of life
rises as he/she ages. Naturally, the uncertainty of the time of death still remains.Therefore, upon reaching retirement age, the individual converts his/her
accumulation into an annuity, which is an insurance product paying speci-
fied amounts to its policyholder for as long as he/she is alive.
The contribution rate in the FF scheme equals that of the PAYG scheme
(denoted by  ) and contributions are mandatory for every participant. Let
i denote the nominal yield rate of personal pension accounts – we assume
the value of i to be near zero just like g, s(t) and  . From this point onwards,
let E denote the life expectancy of the individual’s birth cohort conditional
on reaching age R. Suppose the individual has the choice to opt out of
the PAYG scheme, divert the contributions into the FF scheme and annui-
tize his/her personal account accumulation upon retirement. The individual
purchases an escalating annuity with escalation rate g, i.e. FF benefits rise
at the same rate as PAYG benefits.23 The present value of annuity payouts
of a person who dies at age E is lower than the price of the annuity due to
the cost of administration, marketing and also the phenomenon of adverse
selection in the annuities market.24 Let a certain share of the total accu-
mulation covering this cost be denoted by c.
Thus, the benefit bFF(t) increases according to (4) and the real value of
the individual’s accumulation at the time of retirement less the annuitiza-
tion cost equals the present value of FF benefits, i.e.
(1 – c) .  
R
h   . w(t) . e(i– ).(R–t)dt =  
E
R
bFF(t) . e( –i).(t–R)dt (20)
Then, it can be obtained from (3), (4) and (20) that
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FIGURE 2  PAYG Replacement Ratio Based on w(R)
23Alternatively, the individual may buy a nominal annuity, which pays a constant nominal pay-
out each period, or a real “inflation-indexed” annuity whose nominal payout is adjusted each
period by the percentage change in the price level, etc. Since, however, none of the conclusions
reached in this text would be affected by the choice of insurance product, an escalating annu-
ity is used for convenience.
24 The problem of adverse selection in the private annuities market means the empirical evi-
dence that the annuitants’ life expectancy is higher than in the population at large and insu-




lim   PAYG(w(R))
w(R)→+  o
w0(R)        w1(R)                          w2(R)                                           w(R)
 PAYG 
R
h e(g–i).(t–R) +  
t
R




is the FF replacement ratio. Note that  FF(w(h)) = const. owing to no redi-
stribution within the system. This is congruent with our intuition that if
the individual’s lifetime wage (and contributions) ceteris paribus doubled,
his/her savings in the personal pension account would double as well, which
would eventually translate into doubling of his/her pension benefits.
2.5 Individual Choice of Pension Arrangement
The individual has the choice to switch an arbitrary portion of PAYG con-
tributions to a pension fund at the expense of receiving proportionately re-
duced PAYG benefits in the future without any compensation for the past
contributions, i.e. a proportionate part of the accumulated rights under
the PAYG scheme is completely eliminated. Denote the combination of sche-
mes in the individual pension arrangement as      0, 1 , i.e.
– –   .   is the rate of contributions to the FF scheme,
– – (1 –  )   is the rate of contributions to the PAYG scheme.
Using (15) and (21), we define the individual’s resulting replacement ratio
as
  =   .  FF + (1 –  ) .  PAYG (22)
The individual’s wage is exogenous and his/her optimization problem is
replacement ratio maximization. Therefore, on the condition that the risks
associated with both schemes are identical,25 the individual switches if and
only if
  >  PAYG (23)
Alternatively, inserting (22) into (23) and rearranging yields
 FF >  PAYG (24)
Suppose there is an upper limit on the extent of switching denoted as
 MAX    0, 1 . Then (22) and (24) imply
d 
–– =  FF –  PAYG > 0 (25)
d 
and   is maximized at   =  MAX on  0,  MAX . Therefore, given the opportu-
nity to divert an arbitrary percentage of PAYG contributions into a FF
scheme in exchange for the same percentage reduction in traditional pub-
lic pension benefits, if the individual switches, he/she does so to the maxi-
mum possible extent.26
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25 This is a great simplification indeed – the risks associated with both pension plans have al-
ready been discussed.This conclusion is obvious in Figure 3.  FF is the same for all workers aged
h regardless of their wages whereas  PAYG declines with income due to re-
distribution within the PAYG scheme. After a switch into a mixed scheme,
the resulting replacement ratio of those whose  PAYG exceeds  FF falls and
the greater the extent of switching, the greater the drop. For those whose
 PAYG is lower than  FF, the situation is reversed and the greater the extent
of switching, the greater the resulting replacement ratio. Given an upper
limit on the extent of switching,   MAX denotes the replacement ratio attain-
able by switching to the maximum possible extent and w*(h) denotes
the switching wage in the cohort of workers aged h.
If the rate of return i ceteris paribus increases, the graph of  FF shifts pa-
rallelly upwards, thus decreasing the switching wage. If women’s retire-
ment period E – R is longer than that of men due to women’s higher life ex-
pectancy, then the change of sex from male to female ceteris paribus shifts
the graph of  FF parallelly downwards, thus increasing the switching wage.
If age h is ceteris paribus increased, then the graph of  FF shifts parallelly
downwards. However, albeit the range of attainable values of  PAYG re-
mains unaffected, the graph of  PAYG generally changes too as h varies. In
this case, the resulting change in the switching wage is not clear without
the specification of wage growth rates.27
3. Simulations
3.1 Assumptions
We consider 2005 to be the year of a pension-scheme reform.28 In our cal-
culations, we use this values of parameters – see Table 1:29
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FIGURE 3 Mixed-scheme Replacement Ratio for a Given h and  MAX   (0, 1)
26 It is worth repeating that the difference in the nature of risk in both schemes is ignored.
27 In this general descriptive model, concrete wage growth rates are not specified. This is only
done in Section 3 where computer simulations are conducted (for instance, see the dependence
of the switching wage on age in Table 8 and Table 9).
 












w*(h) w1(h)                   w2(h)Thus, the national growth of real wages is 3 % p.a. in the whole projected
period (which spans about 60 years in the case of new entrants), the old-
-age pension contributions to the PAYG scheme are 20 % of gross wages30
and the cost of annuitization is 10 % of the accumulation.31
The individual enters the labor force at 23 if male and at 27 if female,
and retires at the pensionable age of 65.32 The life expectancy conditional
on reaching age 65 is 78.72 for men and 82.09 for women using the 2000
mortality rates (âSÚ, 2002). These can be expected to increase. However,
the extent of this increase is fairly difficult to estimate with any degree of
precision as it means estimating the average age of dying in several deca-
des from now. Therefore, alternative scenarios are considered. It is not easy
to estimate s(t) either.33 This function serves as an approximation of the rate
of theindividual’swage growth over time cleared of thegeneral wage growth
in the economy and we set s(t) so that this rate decreases over the indivi-
dual’s career – see Table 2.
521 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 53, 2003, ã. 11-12
TABLE 1 Values of Parameters Used in the Simulations
TABLE 2 Differences between Individual and National Wage Growth Rates
28 This is due to the fact that the preparation of such a complex reform requires some time. As
a consequence, 2005 is a base year for the calculation of all real values. Moreover, all those who
choose to switch are likely to retire after the Czech Republic’s entry into the Economic and Mo-
netary Union, i.e. they will receive pension benefits in euros rather than Czech crowns. How-
ever, the results of our simulations are unaffected by the choice of currency units.
29 Strictly speaking, a gradual increase in the period   from 2005 to 2016 is considered.
30 The total contribution rate is currently 26 % (19.5 % is paid by the employer) and the scheme
already runs deficits. We assume this rate to be increased to 30 % by 2005 in an attempt for
a fiscally sustainable PAYG scheme. Since, however, almost 30 % of total PAYG expenditures
cover non-old-age (disability and survivors) pensions, we assume that 10 percentage points of
the total contribution rate go towards non-old-age pensions (with the ‘surplus’ being reallocat-
ed towards old-age pensions) and only 20 percentage points are earmarked for old-age pensi-
ons. Bezdûk (2000) demonstrates that if there is to be full wage indexation of pension benefits,
the current PAYG scheme may be fiscally sustainable with a contribution rate of 30 %, the sta-
tutory retirement age of 65 irrespective of gender, a reduction in early retirements by 50 %,
a reduction in disability and survivors pensions by 10 % and the gross replacement ratio for
the economy (i.e. the ratio of the average pension benefit and the average gross national wage)
reduced from the current 44 % to 38 %. As the initial reduction in this replacement ratio is not
assumed in the simulations, the expected performance of the PAYG system is still overesti-
mated.
31 Mitchell and McCarthy (2002) compare the present values of expected annuity payouts with
the prices of annuities in a range of developed countries, using the population mortality tables.
They conclude that “atypical member of thepopulation could anticipate receiving at least 90per-
cent of his premium from the single life annuity. The results also imply that adverse selection
as well as loadings and administrative charges must be below ten percent of the purchase price.”
(p. 14)
g   c   bb(2005) p1(2005) p2(2005)
0.05 0.02 0.2 0.1 30 1,500 8,500 20,000
Age 23 27 30 35 40 45 47.5 50 55 60 65
s(t) in % 4.5 3.3 2.6 1.6 0.9 0.3 0 –0.2 –0.7 –1.0 –1.3For the sake of simplicity, we apply these rates uniformly to all workers in
our simulations regardless of gender and level of earnings.
It is worth reiterating that we assume no reform to the current PAYG
scheme and a complete elimination of a proportionate part of the acquired
rights under this scheme for those who switch. One of the main objectives
of this paper is to compare the replacement ratios attainable in the FF
scheme with those attained in the PAYG scheme as currently structured,
thus illustrating the relatively poor performance of the latter scheme. I be-
lieve that after reform, the PAYG scheme should remain a redistributive
defined benefit scheme, although the current weak link between contri-
butions and benefits should be strengthened while a minimum pension in-
come would continue to be ensured. In such a case, the switching outco-
mes would differ from those presented in the following text and generally
more lower-income workers would tend to switch. However, introducing
some arbitrarily redefined PAYG formulae would probably add to confu-
sion rather than make a stronger case for reform and, therefore, current
formulae are used as described in Section 2. Thus, we can proceed further
and investigate the microeconomic pros and cons of the alternative pen-
sion schemes.34
3.2 What Are the Alternatives?
One possible way of measuring the performance of pension schemes is
comparing the amount of contributions an individual makes during his/her
working life with the amount of benefits the very same individual can ex-
pect to receive after he/she has retired. Assume a five-year increase in cur-
rent life expectancies, a real discount rate of 5 % p.a.,35 and a 20% rate of
contribution towards old-age pensions as used throughout our simula-
tions.
By definition, the present value of contributions to the FF scheme equals
thepresent value of benefits received after retirement. However, unlike pub-
lic PAYG schemes, this scheme by itself may not provide insurance against
longevity if, for instance, lump-sum withdrawals are an option. Therefore,
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32 Of course, some persons enter the work force at an earlier age, some later. The reasons for
not setting the age of new entrants at 20 (implying 45 years to be spent in the labor force)
are manifold – higher level education, maternity (or paternity) leave, unemployment, travel
before starting a job, etc. As a compromise, there are 42 years of work ahead of new male en-
trants (R = P = 42) and 38 years of work ahead of new female entrants (R = P = 38). Since,
however, non-contribution periods such as unemployment, higher level education or child 
rearing are added to the contribution years in the PAYG scheme, we use 45 years of partici-
pation in the PAYG benefit formulae. Strictly speaking, the above values implying the pension-
able age of 65 are used only for workers aged 50 or less in 2005. Currently, the pensionable
age is being raised gradually from 60 for men and 53–57 for women (depending on the num-
ber of children reared) in 1995 to 62 and 57–61 in 2007. We assume a further phased increa-
se until it reaches 65 for both men and women in 2020, and we use the statutory retirement
age for a woman with 2 children in the simulations.
33 For a discussion of this and our concrete choice of s(t), see the Appendix.
34 The mathematical software package Maple was used for the simulations.
35 Reasons for these assumptions are given later in Scenario 3 where they are used as well.if the performance of these schemes is to be compared, the cost of this in-
surance in the FF scheme has to be considered. As noted earlier, the pre-
sent value of expected annuity payouts in the population at large may be
up to ten percent lower than the price of the annuity. Therefore, the ave-
rage FF scheme participant can expect to receive at least 90 % of his/her
contributions with accrued interest back in the form of annuity payouts.
This, however, is not thecase of thePAYG scheme and if we compare thepre-
sent values of individuals’benefits in the alternative pension plans, we find
that they differ substantially. These differences can be seen in Table 3 and
Table 4.36,37
Thus, it is clear after comparing these present values that while partici-
pants in the FF scheme can expect to receive approximately 10 % less than
they will have contributed, the expectations of most PAYG-scheme partici-
pants cannot be so high. A man entering the work force with the national
average wage (CZK 20,000 in 2005) can expect to receive 2.3 times less in
pension benefits than he will have contributed during his working life and
aw oman with that wage can expect 1.6 times less. If a man earns a wage
two and a half times higher than the national average wage (CZK 50,000
in 2005), he can expect to receive 4.4 times less than his past contributions
and a woman earning that wage can expect to receive 3.2 times less. Note
that while the latter workers contribute over seven times more than sub-
sistence-wage earners, they receive less than twice higher benefits. This is
due to justified redistribution towards individuals who are not able to con-
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TABLE 3 Present Values of Contributions and Benefits in 2005 (CZK) – Men
TABLE 4 Present Values of Contributions and Benefits in 2005 (CZK) – Women
36 PVC denotes the present value of contributions, PVBFF = 0.9PVC denotes the present value
of FF benefits, and PVBPAYG denotes the present value of PAYG benefits. While PVBFFmay well
be higher than 0.9 PVC, PVBPAYG is likely to be slightly lower than presented due to our overly
optimistic assumptions about the financial sustainability of the PAYG scheme.
37 wage0 = CZK 7,000 and wageMEAN = CZK 20,000 are assumed to be the monthly subsistence
wage and national average wage in 2005, respectively. In 2000, approximately 65 % of workers
earned less than the national average wage (âSÚ, 2001b).
Monthly wage upon entry into labor force in 2005:
CZK 7,000 CZK 10,000 CZK 20,000 CZK 50,000
PVC 667,000 953,000 1,907,000 4,767,000
PVBFF 601,000 858,000 1,716,000 4,290,000
PVBPAYG 626,000 701,000 839,000 1,088,000
Monthly wage upon entry into labor force in 2005:
CZK 7,000 CZK 10,000 CZK 20,000 CZK 50,000
PVC 554,000 791,000 1,582,000 3,956,000
PVBFF 498,000 712,000 1,424,000 3,561,000
PVBPAYG 733,000 811,000 994,000 1,254,000tribute sufficiently for their own retirement. Surprising as it may seem, how-
ever, a man earning the subsistence wage (CZK 7,000 in 2005) upon entry
into the labor force can expect to receive almost 10 % less than his past con-
tributions and a woman with that wage can expect to receive (only) about
30 % more. The calculations reveal that only women earning 60 % of the na-
tional average wage (i.e. about CZK 12,000 in 2005) or less when entering
the work force are net recipients in the PAYG scheme and in the popula-
tion of men, this scheme is actuarially fair only to subsistence-wage ear-
ners. Given the mounting demographic pressures, it is unthinkable that
this situation should improve.38
This indicates that the PAYG scheme is challenged by the FF scheme even
at the microeconomic level and it seems that a partial transition to the FF
system would make most labor force entrants and young workers better off.
However, it might be argued that the actual yield rate of personal accounts
may be lower than the assumed 5 % p.a. in real terms or that a contribu-
tion period of 42 years if male and 38 years if female is not feasible for some
workers. These objections have to be taken into account and an analysis
including comparisons of various scenarios is needed.
3.3 Alternative Scenarios
3.3.1 Scenario 1
The yield rate of personal accounts is 6 % p.a. in real terms. The life ex-
pectancy conditional on reaching age 65 is 82 and 85 years for men and wo-
men, respectively, i.e. only a three-year increase in the current values is as-
sumed. With such expectations, workers estimate their retirement income
in alternative schemes. Utilizing replacement ratios, Table 5 shows the al-
ternatives of individuals based on age, gender and earnings level.39,40
Under these assumptions, the PAYG scheme as currently structured
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TABLE 5 Comparison of Alternative Replacement Ratios
 FF (in %)  PAYG (in %) for those earning in 2005:
Age men women CZK 7,000 CZK 10,000 CZK 20,000 CZK 50,000
23 114.7 – 79.6 62.3 37.3 19.4
27 100.6 89.0 89.2 69.1 42.4 21.4
30 89.7 79.5 93.7 73.5 45.6 22.7
35 72.1 63.8 88.9 79.2 49.8 24.4
40 55.6 49.2 88.9 82.8 52.5 25.5
45 40.7 36.1 88.9 84.6 53.4 26.0
50 27.8 24.6 88.9 84.6 53.4 26.0
38 Unless redistribution towards certain groups of workers is strengthened even further.
39  FF denotes the replacement ratio in the FF scheme in the event of a full switch at a given
age.  PAYG denotes the replacement ratio based on the income level at a given age offered by
the PAYG scheme to those who remain “faithful”.seems to be actuarially fair only to female subsistence-wage earners. Thus,
should switching be mandatory, no labor force entrant would experience
a drop in his/her expected retirement income and all men up to the age of 29
would benefit from switching regardless of their earnings.41 By entering
a 50–50 mixed scheme42 instead of entering the PAYG scheme solely, new
male labor force entrants earning the subsistence wage would achieve
a 22% increase in their pension benefits relative to the benefits they can
expect now. Thepension benefits of middle- and upper-income groups would
rise dramatically. By entering a 50–50 mixed scheme, a male labor force
entrant earning the average wage would achieve twice higher pension be-
nefits and a woman in the same situation would increase her benefits by
55 %. By switching into this scheme, a 30-year-old man earning the ave-
rage wage would achieve a 48% increase in pension income and a woman
of the same age and wage would increase her pension income by 37 %. If
the performance of pension funds were as strong as it is in this scenario
with a modest increase in life expectancies only, the transition towards
an alternative scheme would be smooth and it seems that an overwhel-
ming majority of young persons would enjoy increased financial security
later in old age.
3.3.2 Scenario 2
The yield rate of personal accounts is 4 % p.a. in real terms. The life ex-
pectancy conditional on reaching age 65 is 86 and 89 years for men and wo-
men, respectively, i.e. an approximately seven-year increase in current life
expectancies is assumed.43 In comparison with the previous scenario, the re-
placement ratios attainable in the FF scheme fall and because the repla-
cement ratios in the PAYG scheme do not change, the lowest income levels
for individual age cohorts necessary to achieve higher pension benefits in
a mixed scheme rise. Replacement ratios for this scenario are summarized
in Table 6.
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40 If, for the sake of consistency, we stuck to our universal values of s(t) even in the case of work-
ers aged more than 33 earning the subsistence wage, we would allow their wages to fall slightly
below the subsistence level later in their working lives. To avoid this, we let the wages of these
workers follow the development of the subsistence wage until retirement. Consequently, the ac-
tual FF replacement ratios of these workers are lower than presented in the table by approxi-
mately 5 percentage points. Thus, the highest gross replacement ratio “attainable” in the PAYG
scheme by workers whose wages grow at the same rate as the national average wage is ap-
proximately 90 %, i.e. the net replacement ratio (the ratio of the first benefit received after re-
tirement and the last pre-retirement net wage) can exceed 100 %. Clearly, as shown in the table,
workers with wages growing faster early in their career and more slowly later, thus approach-
ing the subsistence wage, can “attain” even higher replacement ratios, but that information is
of little relevance when measuring the performance of a pension scheme.
41 These results were obtained by comparing replacement ratios  FF and  PAYG for individual age
cohorts. Table 5 summarizes replacement ratios for selected cohorts and PAYG ratios are shown
only for selected wage levels.
42Ascheme in which 50 percent of the total old-age pension contributions flow to the PAYG plan
and 50 percent flow to the FF plan. According to (22), the replacement ratio in this scheme is
the arithmetic mean of  PAYG and  FF for a given age and income level.
43 While such longevity might be good for individuals, it would be less so for the ailing PAYG
scheme.Under these assumptions, female average-wage earners entering the la-
bor force would still be rather indifferent between the two alternative sche-
mes, but male average-wage earners aged up to 28 would be better off switch-
ing. For instance, amale labor force entrant earning theaverage wage would
increase his pension benefits by 18 % if he entered a 50-50 mixed scheme.
Most importantly, however, the FF scheme is not attractive for the lowest-
-earning persons and should entry into a mixed scheme be compulsory for
some age cohorts of workers, the socially weakest would be hurt. By ente-
ring a 50–50 mixed scheme, a male worker earning the subsistence wage
upon entry into labor force would experience a relative drop in pension in-
come of 18 % and this drop would be 27 % for a woman in the same situa-
tion. A 30-year-old man earning the subsistence wage switching into this
scheme would see his pension income fall by 27 % and this drop would be
30 % for a woman of the same age with the same wage. Moreover, longer
periods of non-contribution could significantly exacerbate the situation of
these persons. Thus, if pension funds underperformed, the lowest earning
individuals would be the first to feel the consequences and this is an argu-
ment for not forcing these individuals to switch and retaining a limited
PAYG scheme in which redistribution based on solidarity secures a decent
retirement income for the poorest.
3.3.3 Scenario 3 – A Conservative Forecast
In order to evaluate the impact of the proposed reform on the retirement
income of current or future workers and estimate the responses of current
workers to the opportunity to switch into an alternative scheme, it is im-
portant to use conservative assumptions about theyield of personal accounts
and life expectancies of future retirees.
The US President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001) as-
sumes that individuals in the United States opting for personal accounts
hold a portfolio which consists of 50 percent equities, 30 percent corporate
bonds, and 20 percent government bonds. They utilize the rates of return
on those assets as recommended by the Office of the Actuary of the Social
Security Administration: “Equities are assumed to provide an ultimate ex-
pected real rate of return of 6.5 percent. Corporate and Treasury bonds are
assumed to provide a real rate of return of 3.5 percent and 3.0 percent re-
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TABLE 6 Comparison of Alternative Replacement Ratios
 FF (in %)  PAYG (in %) for those earning in 2005:
Age men women CZK 7,000 CZK 10,000 CZK 20,000 CZK 50,000
23 51.0 – 79.6 62.3 37.3 19.4
27 46.5 41.3 89.2 69.1 42.4 21.4
30 42.9 38.1 93.7 73.5 45.6 22.7
35 36.4 32.3 88.9 79.2 49.8 24.4
40 29.7 26.4 88.9 82.8 52.5 25.5
45 23.0 20.5 88.9 84.6 53.4 26.0
50 16.6 14.8 88.9 84.6 53.4 26.0spectively. Administrative costs are assumed to be [...] 0.3 percent of
the account balance. [...] The overall expected real return for this [...] port-
folio, net of expenses, is therefore a conservative 4.6 percent. This portfolio
return is much lower than that used in many academic studies of personal
accounts.” (p. 97) They add that actual administrative costs could be lower
than assumed. Similarly, Acun ~a and Iglesias (2001, p. 25) state that “[...]
in Chile’s case, 5 % (real) return is a lower limit for forecasting the yield of
the pension funds in the long term”. The rates of return of pension funds
as well as the administrative costs differ in various countries and are in-
fluenced by the stringency of the government regulation of pension funds
and the overall institutional arrangement of the FF scheme. However, with
an expected real rate of return of government bonds of 3 % p.a., pension
funds in the Czech Republic should be able to attain a real rate of return
exceeding 5 % annually through portfolio diversification without a sub-
stantial risk increase. Therefore, we assume that the rate of return of per-
sonal pension accounts, after deduction of administrative costs, is 5 % p.a.
in real terms.44
The increase in life expectancies is difficult to predict. We assume a five-
-year increase in current values, i.e. the life expectancy conditional on reach-
ing age 65 is 84 and 87 years for men and women, respectively. It is pos-
sible that the actual increase turns out to be greater, but that would bring
additional strains on the PAYG scheme and full wage indexation of bene-
fits would be even less likely in the long run.45 Therefore, I believe that by
using these values we do not overestimate the expected benefits in the FF
scheme relative to those in the PAYG scheme.
Under these assumptions, the resulting replacement ratios are as shown
in Table 7.
There seem to be few, if any, male labor force entrants who would prefer
the old scheme to a new mixed one, and by entering a 50-50 mixed scheme,
al arge number of young male workers with a relatively low earning capa-
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TABLE 7 Comparison of Alternative Replacement Ratios
 FF (in %)  PAYG (in %) for those earning in 2005:
Age men women CZK 7,000 CZK 10,000 CZK 20,000 CZK 50,000
23 76.4 – 79.6 62.3 37.3 19.4
27 68.3 60.7 89.2 69.1 42.4 21.4
30 62.0 55.1 93.7 73.5 45.6 22.7
35 51.3 45.5 88.9 79.2 49.8 24.4
40 40.7 36.2 88.9 82.8 52.5 25.5
45 30.7 27.3 88.9 84.6 53.4 26.0
50 21.6 19.2 88.9 84.6 53.4 26.0
44 Results obtained with alternative returns are presented in the Appendix.
45 A sharp unexpected rise in life expectancies would, ceteris paribus, undoubtedly put paid to
the government’s efforts to maintain pension benefits wage-indexed and, therefore, further aus-
terity measures in the form of parameter adjustments would be needed (for instance the pen-
sionable age could be increased to 67).city could achieve a non-negligible increase in the standard of their living
in old age. For instance, in the case of new male labor force entrants ear-
ning a wage equal to one half of the national average wage (CZK 10,000 in
2005), the increase would be 11 %. For middle-income groups, switching
into a 50–50 mixed scheme could result in a substantial increase in future
pension benefits. For illustration, it would be 52 % and 22 % for male and
female labor force entrants earning the average wage, respectively. How-
ever, if the current high level of redistribution were to be maintained in
the PAYG scheme, the lowest-earning young women would be better off re-
maining in this scheme rather than switching into a mixed one. For in-
stance, female workers earning the subsistence wage upon entry into
the work force would experience a 16% drop in pension income after ente-
ring a 50–50 mixed scheme. Nevertheless, it is obvious that a large num-
ber of female labor force entrants would benefit from entering a mixed
scheme.46 Estimates of the lowest wage levels at which switching would
make individuals better off are presented in Table 8 and Table 9.47
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TABLE 8 Switching Wages (CZK per month) – Men
TABLE 9 Switching Wages (CZK per month) – Women
Age w* Age w* Age w* Age w*
23 7,500 32 15,200 41 29,200 50 65,600
24 8,100 33 16,500 42 31,400 51 80,800
25 8,700 34 18,000 43 33,900 52 98,600
26 9,500 35 19,400 44 36,700 53 125,100
27 10,200 36 20,700 45 39,900 54 183,800
28 11,000 37 22,100 46 43,500 55 291,200
29 11,900 38 23,700 47 47,700 56 673,900
30 12,900 39 25,300 48 52,600 57+ n/a
31 14,000 40 27,200 49 58,500
Age w* Age w* Age w* Age w*
27 12,200 35 22,300 43 39,500 51 117,800
28 13,300 36 23,800 44 42,900 52 160,700
29 14,400 37 25,500 45 46,700 53 303,800
30 15,600 38 27,300 46 51,200 54 1.883,200
31 17,000 39 29,300 47 56,400 55+ n/a
32 18,300 40 31,400 48 62,500
33 19,600 41 33,800 49 69,900
34 20,900 42 36,500 50 79,100
46 Because the average gross wage of women is lower than that of men (the difference was
26.7 % in 2000 – (âSÚ, 2001a)), PAYG benefits of women are, on average, lower than those
of men despite the fact that the PAYG formulae do not discern between genders. How-
ever, due to the fact that the life expectancy in the population of women is higher than in
the population of men (and also because women’s contribution periods are generally shorter
due to child rearing, which the PAYG scheme treats like a contribution period), the introduc-
tion of a FF scheme would widen the gap between the average pension benefits of men and
women.Since workers earning the lowest wages tend to be unskilled and likely
to start working earlier than we assume, a 42-year contribution period for
such men and 38-year contribution period for such women may not be in-
feasible even if we allow for short non-contribution spells. However, very
long periods of unemployment that some of these workers may experience
could curtail the period over which they are able to contribute and caution
should be exercised in the interpretation of the results presented.48
Let us finally consider hypothetical mandatory switching into a 50-50
mixed scheme for all persons up to the age of 30 years and estimate its
impact on the lowest-earning workers – for simplicity those earning
the subsistence wage. In addition, suppose that there is no experience-re-
lated wage increase at the beginning of the career of these workers and
they earn the subsistence wage until retirement.49 Then the retirement
income of male labor force entrants would fall by 8 % and female entrants
would experience adrop of 18%. For 30-year-old workers, mandatory switch-
ing would mean a slightly more pronounced forced decrease in expected
pension benefits – it would be 18 % in the case of men and 21 % in the case
of women. Again, although these differences may not seem very large con-
sidering the fact that the real value of those “decreased” benefits would,
in the distant future, be much higher than that of benefits received by
pensioners today, the relative fall in the standard of living of these per-
sons after retirement could be deepened by substantial non-contribution
periods.
4. Policy Implications and Conclusion
It is worth bearing in mind that the results presented apply to workers
with a particular wage development over their careers. We assumed a smooth
uninterrupted stream of contributions from the time of switching until re-
tirement and allowed for no “jumps” in the individual age-earnings profi-
les caused by changes of jobs or “gaps” in these profiles due to unemploy-
ment, child rearing or health problems. In fact, wage trajectories are subject
to risk just like capital returns, demographic development or political ma-
nagement of public pension schemes. It is also important to realize that
the rate of return on capital is a crucial factor determining retirement in-
come in the FF scheme50 and expectations about returns may vary across
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47 “n/a” means not applicable at this age level because
 FF <       inf         PAYG(w(h)) =   lim     PAYG(w(h))
w(h)  w0(h), + ) w(h)→+ 
To see this, the reader may find Figure 3 illustrative.
48 Consider an individual aged h who, for various reasons, is unable to contribute to his/her per-
sonal account for n years between the time of switching and retirement. Then, the switch-
ing wage in the cohort of workers aged h + n can serve as a rough approximation of the indivi-
dual’s actual switching wage.
49 Formally: s(t)   0, t    0, R . The data in Table 10 in the Appendix indicate that this results
in a better approximation of the wage development of e.g. unskilled female workers. For detai-
led estimates of replacement ratios under this assumption, see Table 13 in the Appendix.
50 See Table 11 and Table 12 in the Appendix.individuals, thus affecting their switching decision. Therefore, we explored
three scenarios in which we covered a reasonable range of likely returns as
well as life expectancies. The simulations suggested that an overwhelming
majority of new labor force entrants would increase their standard of living
in old age by entering an alternative pension plan, and they can be expec-
ted to do so once they are given the opportunity. Furthermore, a large num-
ber of current workers would be better off switching without any compen-
sation for their past contributions to the public pension scheme, thus
decreasing its implicit debt.
We considered scenarios in which workers were given the opportunity to
divert a percentage of PAYG contributions into the FF scheme in exchange
for the same percentage reduction in PAYG benefits. In addition, incenti-
ves in the form of “tax relief” for these workers or allowing reverse switch-
ing within a certain “guarantee” period might be considered – this is open
to further discussion. I believe that after reform, the PAYG scheme should
remain a defined benefit scheme, although a reduction in the current rela-
tively high level of redistribution may be considered so that subsistence be-
nefits continue to be guaranteed, but otherwise benefits are more earnings-
-related, thus in all likelihood reducing labor market distortions. Never-
theless, to avoid any arbitrary adjustments to the current benefit formu-
lae, these formulae were conserved and the simulations illustrated that des-
pite its strong redistribution towards low-income workers, the relative per-
formance of the PAYG plan is so poor that a large number of young persons
with low earnings would be better off in a funded scheme.
A critical question for reformers is the extent of switching. The World
Bank (1994, p. 23) states: “The right mix of [schemes] is not the same at all
times and places. It depends on a country’s objectives, history, and current
circumstances, particularly its emphasis on redistribution versus saving,
its financial markets, and its taxing and regulatory capability. The kind of
reform needed and the pace [...] will also vary [...].” Both schemes are sub-
ject to different kinds of risk – the FF scheme is associated with investment
risks whereas participants in the PAYG scheme are exposed to political
risks. Disney et al. (1999, p. 22) point out that “it should not be assumed
that [political] risk is a priori lower than the investment risk associated
with funded plans”. Browning (1975) shows that it is rational for a politi-
cian in a democracy to overpromise pensions since the cost is to be borne
by future generations when the respected politician is already out of office.
The two schemes should be viewed as two portfolios with very imperfectly
correlated returns. In order to diversify the risks, a combination of both
schemes seems optimal for individuals although people with different de-
grees of risk aversion may favor different combinations. Because the tran-
sition to a mixed scheme is, however, associated with substantial costs,
the extent to which individuals are allowed to opt out of the PAYG scheme
is likely to depend on the political climate.51 For this reason, the results of
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51 The greater the switch, the higher the transition costs. For instance, Hungary has
so far allowed workers to divert 1/5 of mandatory contributions to a FF scheme and Po-
lish workers may switch over 1/3 of old-age pension contributions to private pension
funds.the simulations were presented in a form enabling a simple computation of
replacement ratios for any mix of schemes. These results suggest that even
a relatively low extent of switching could mean substantially higher pen-
sion benefits for a large number of future retirees.
The ultimate impact of the reform fundamentally depends on how
the transition to a mixed scheme is financed. For instance, national savings
will not be increased if the transition is financed 100 percent by debt with
no other changes. An increase in savings requires a cut in consumption –
either public or private. If the government raises taxes or cuts other ex-
penditures in order to finance the transition out of current general tax re-
venues, the possibility of increased national savings and enhanced econo-
mic growth emerges. Therefore, the reform should be at least partially
tax-financed. The financing strategy critically determines the generational
distribution of the costs and benefits of reform. In the case of a debt-finan-
ced transition, some cohorts might win as pensioners but heavily lose as
taxpayers in order to serve the implicit-turned-explicit debt in the future.
In the case of a tax-financed transition, if taxes are raised, the current ge-
neration bears the brunt of reform because it has to pay taxes to cover
the transitional public pension deficits while also saving for their own re-
tirement. Similarly, a reduction in other government expenditures hurts
groups that would otherwise benefit from the programs that are restricted
(the current generation if current spending is reduced, future generations
if government investment is reduced). In order to spread the costs of tran-
sition over current and future cohorts in a possibly fair and socially accept-
able manner, a mixed financing strategy would probably have to be adop-
ted, i.e. a combination of tax and debt.52 The benefits would then be realized
at a corresponding speed. The choice of the right financing strategy is, how-
ever, a complex issue which goes beyond the scope of this paper. The pos-
sible welfare consequences for different generations (including the question
whether a Pareto-improving transition could be achieved) are outlined in
(Kotlikoff, 1995). The World Bank (1994, p. 272) states: “The biggest win-
ners are likely to be the generations following the transition, who will reap
the economic gains of increased efficiency and growth.”
Another question is whether participation in thenew mixed system should
be voluntary or mandatory, and in the latter case, for whom it should be so.
It has been shown that the lowest-earning workers would be the first to be
hurt if pension funds underperformed and given the fact that low-earning
individuals are the most likely to have their career histories interrupted by
longer non-contribution periods, I believe that workers should be given
the opportunity to remain in the PAYG scheme and this should be so even
for new labor force entrants.53 However, all workers up to a certain age li-
mit should freely choose which alternative they prefer. This limit could well
be 50 years of age as our estimates show that high-earning individuals
would still be better off switching even in their late 40s.54 One of the dis-
tinct advantages of a voluntary switching approach is the fact that workers
voluntarily renounce part of their accumulated rights under the old scheme
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52 Some countries also used privatization revenues to significantly reduce the implicit debt, but
the Czech Republic missed this opportunity in the 1990’s.and its implicit debt is reduced. If an individual decides to switch, he/she
voluntarily runs the risk of not being able to save sufficiently for retirement
and cannot claim any additional benefits from the government if it so
occurs.55 The government would only provide guarantees in case of bank-
ruptcy of pension funds or insurance companies.56 Even though no single
worker would be compelled to enter an alternative pension scheme, a well-
-designed awareness-raising campaign run by the government should en-
sure that within a generation or two, only a small number of the lowest-
-earning individuals would participate in the PAYG scheme fully, the rest
of the work force having freely opted for a mixed scheme.
So far, we have assumed that workers annuitize all their accumulation.
There are, however, more possibilities. Retirees might, for instance, opt for
scheduled withdrawals of their savings over the whole retirement period
or, in the most extreme case, they might withdraw all their accumulation
as a lump sum upon retirement. Obviously, this would not only eliminate
annuitization costs, but also maintain the longevity risk. Experience sug-
gests that most workers seek to insure themselves against this risk – for
instance in Chile, workers may choose between scheduled withdrawals and
life annuities, but the percentage of workers opting for the latter is increa-
sing constantly.57 It is generally recognized that one of the main purposes
of mandatory pension plans is the protection of individuals against ending
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53 It can be argued that new entrants should be forced to a mixed scheme because experience
shows that young people tend to switch massively and such a mandatory entry would incur
a minimum welfare loss (the population affected would be minimal) while enhancing admi-
nistrative simplicity. Also, the real value of PAYG benefits “promised” to current labor force
entrants significantly exceeds the real value of benefits received by pensioners today, and
the current high level of redistribution which aims to protect some persons from a very low
standard of living in old age may not be needed in the future. In such a case, the PAYG re-
placement ratios of individuals with a low earning capacity would fall and the FF scheme would
be relatively more attractive for these persons. Even in that case, however, the relative drop
in the pension incomes of the lowest-earning workers due to long non-contribution periods
might be substantial in comparison with the pension incomes which these persons would re-
ceive in the still (albeit less) redistributing PAYG scheme. In the UK, low-income workers were
one of the arguments for not requiring mandatory switching and retaining an unfunded scheme
(the so-called SERPS) at the time of the introduction of a funded scheme (Disney et al., 1999).
Also, in September 2000, 28 % of Chilean workers were self-employed. According to (Acun ~a–  I g -
lesias, 2001), over 95 % of them did not contribute to the mandatory FF system at that time,
“many of [them] hav[ing] low wages” (p. 21). Due to government guarantees of minimum pen-
sion benefits, this poses a future fiscal burden which is by no means negligible. Rusnok (2001)
uses implicit government guarantees as a major argument against the introduction of a fun-
ded scheme.
54 In the case of Poland, switching was mandatory for all workers under the age of 30 and vo-
luntary for those between 30 and 50. In Hungary, switching was compulsory for new labor force
entrants and an implicit age limit for voluntary switching was 35–40 years as entry into the new
scheme was unlikely to be attractive for older workers (Laursen, 2000).
55 In the case of a large extent of switching, it would be socially and politically unacceptable not
to declare guarantees of the subsistence benefits. However, the problem of moral hazard would
have to be addressed in the process of setting the eligibility criteria.
56 For instance in Chile, apart from the guarantee of the minimum pension benefits for those
who meet certain basic eligibility criteria, the government guarantees 100 % of the life annu-
ity payments up to the amount of the minimum pension benefit and 75 % of the amount above
that level.
57 Acun ~a and Iglesias (2001) discuss possible reasons for this trend.up resourceless after retirement.58 Especially in the event of a large extent
of switching, compulsory annuitization would, to the same degree as com-
pulsory contributions to a pension plan, prevent myopic behavior. More-
over, Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) found that the amount of adverse se-
lection in compulsory annuities markets is only half of that in voluntary
markets and conclude that “even a relatively flexible mandatory annuiti-
zation system can substantially reduce this cost” (p. 48). Therefore, I belie-
ve that annuitization should be mandatory up to a certain amount59 of
the accumulation, which would make a mixed scheme more attractive for
low-income risk-averse individuals.60
Schneider (1998) provides the estimates of the macroeconomic implicati-
ons of a full switch to a FF scheme in the Czech Republic. We have con-
ducted simple simulations of the microeconomic impact of reform in order
to demonstrate its merits at the level of individuals. Although it is infea-
sible to estimate the exact impact on every person due to idiosyncrasies in
individual wage developments over their careers, simple approximations of
the lowest wage levels at which male and female workers would benefit
from switching will be instrumental in the process of reform preparation.
Disney et al. (1999) demonstrate that individuals’ responses to the switch-
ing process are fairly predictable in a variety of countries and we have pre-
sented estimates upon which the prediction of the dynamics of voluntary
switching can be based. Due to unfavorable demographic conditions,
the Czech PAYG scheme would be outperformed by a FF scheme and it can
be expected to be so for as far down the road as the eye can see. Indeed, we
have demonstrated under certain conservative assumptions about rates of
return, life expectancies and wage development that among workers with
uninterrupted career histories, only women earning about 60 % of the na-
tional average wage or less upon entering the work force are net recipients
in the currently structured PAYG scheme and in the population of men, this
redistributive scheme is actuarially fair only to subsistence wage earners.
Workers should not be denied the right to increase their standard of living
in old age via a combination of a public PAYG scheme and a private FF
scheme, and we have shown that this increase could be non-negligible even
for future pensioners with a history of relatively low earnings. The sooner
the reform, the better.
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58 Myles (1995) notes that this might happen due to myopia, mistakes made in the process of
planning, lack of information or irrationality.
59 Low-earning individuals who have accumulated less than this amount would be required to
annuitize all their accumulation, but high-earners could withdraw the difference between their
total accumulation and this amount as a lump sum. Thus, myopic individuals would be pre-
vented from becoming a future burden to the public social security system while inefficiencies
resulting from constraining individual choice would be lower than in the case of universal man-
datory annuitization.
60 Due to a “negative relationship between socio-economic status and mortality” (Finkelstein –
Poterba, 2002, p. 31), i.e. low-earning persons are shorter-lived than higher-earning ones, if com-
pulsory annuitization reduces the life expectancies in the population of annuitants, annuitiza-
tion based on these life expectancies is “fairer” towards individuals with a low earning capacity.
Still, if low- and high-income workers are in the same annuity pool, the former end up paying
more than their expected benefits while the latter pay less, and, therefore, equity concerns re-
main.5. Appendix
5.1 The Definition of the Function s(t)
It follows from (3) that ∀t   (0, R):




d2w(t)                                        ds(t) –––––– = w(0) .  (g + s(t) –  )2 + ––––  . e(g– )t +  t
0 s(x)dx (27)
dt2                                                                    dt
d2w(t) Hence, if ∃ t0    0, R) ∀t   (t0, R):    –––––– < 0, then 
ds(t)
dt2
∀t   (t0, R): ––––– < 0 61
dt
We attempt to approximate the development of wages over the working life and
assume that they tend to grow at a decreasing rate. Without the possibility to use
mathematical computer software for thenumerical evaluation of Riemann integrals,
the choice of a particular functional form of s(t) would be constrained by the neces-
sity to express  e t
R
s(x)dxdt explicitly in order to compute for instance (15) or (21). Ade-
creasing function satisfying this condition is e.g.
 1 s(t) = ––––– +  3,  1    ,  2 > 0 (28)
 2 + t
Although this choice may seem somewhat artificial and computer software gives
us much greater freedom in choosing s(t), we stick to this function as it enables us
to obtain values which can be realistic approximations of wage-growth rates due to
human-capital accumulation and ageing. We assume that the rate of growth is grea-
test at the beginning of one’s career because the worker’s increase in productivity
is greatest upon entering the labor force and then decreases. Moreover, we assume
that this slowdown of growth is most “noticeable” at the beginning of one’s career,
i.e. s(t) is convex.
A basic distinction should be made between skilled and unskilled workers. Accor-
ding to (Becker, 1993), skilled workers receive more on-the-job training and returns
to the training are reflected in steeper age-earnings profiles at the beginning of
the career (empirical age-earnings profiles for skilled and unskilled workers are pre-
sented on p. 233; for more on the effects of on-the-job training on earnings, see (Bec-
ker, 1993, pp. 29–51). Becker states that “cross-sectional education profiles [...] [can]
be converted into time series profiles only by adjusting very simply for the secular
growth in incomes” (p. 232). Table 10 shows cross-sectional data about earnings in
the Czech Republic in 2000 classified by age and education.
Hence, we might be able to extract the approximate values of our function s(t).
This, however, may be complicated by the fact that workers older than roughly 35
in 2000 had received education (or training) in socialism and they are likely to have
experienced adifferent wage development from those educated and trained in amar-
ket economy. Nevertheless, the data support Becker’s findings about relatively stee-
per age-earnings profiles at the beginning of the career of skilled workers. Also, Bec-
ker presents (p. 230) similar data for the US in 1939 and 1949 and concludes that
“[...] incomes tend to be relatively low at the beginning of labor force participation,
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61 Naturally, w(0) > 0.rise throughout later ages until a common peak is reached in the 45 to 54 age class,
and decline in the last class” (p. 231). This, though not perfectly, can be observed in
Table 10 as well. Becker adds that e.g. secular trends towards higher education can
render this use of data less precise.
Although it may, for instance, be argued that Becker’s conclusions drawn from
data from themiddle of the20thcentury do not necessarily have to hold in the21stcen-
tury, the data in Table 10 indicate that a decreasing function s(t) should enable us
to finally obtain better estimates of switching-wage levels than if we used a con-
stant wage growth rate over one’s career.62 To simplify the analysis, we use a uni-
form functional form of s(t) for all workers regardless of the type of their job. Spe-
cifically, we set  1 = 3 and  3 = – 0.055 irrespective of gender,  2 = 30 for men and
 2 = 34 for women.63 The worker’s resulting age-wage trajectory is increasing and
convex from the age of entry into the labor force to the age of 44, and then concave,
but still increasing, until retirement.
5.2 Scenario 3 – Alternative Returns
The estimates are obtained under the same assumptions about life expectancies
as in Scenario 3 (84 and 87 conditional on reaching 65 for men and women, respec-
tively), but the real yield rates of personal accounts are varied (originally 5 % p.a.).
Apparently, FF replacement ratios are very sensitive to changes in the yield rate.
(PAYG replacement ratios are not affected by these changes and are identical to
those in Table 7.)
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TABLE 10 Average Gross Wages in the Czech Republic in 2000 (CZK per month for workers employed full
time) Based on Gender, Age and Education Attained
Age
men women
elementary college elementary college
under 19 9,380 – 8,278 –
20–24 11,641 14,752 9,159 11,933
25–29 12,765 22,874 9,130 17,482
30–34 13,351 31,142 8,759 18,091
35–39 12,872 31,560 8,860 17,666
40–44 12,720 30,957 9,264 19,822
45–49 12,801 31,813 9,414 20,993
50–54 12,492 32,306 9,464 20,742
55–59 12,163 30,456 9,340 19,550
60–64 10,769 30,630 7,481 20,224
over 65 7,391 22,066 6,939 19,272
Source: (Czech Statistical Office, 2001a)
62 In the latter case, older workers would slightly overestimate their future incomes, i.e. their ability
to save sufficiently for retirement.
63 The national real wage growth rate g –   = 3 % is smaller than the average real wage growth rate
over the worker’s career 
which equals 3.8 % for men and 3.4 % for women. This is to be attributed to the ageing of the labor




0 [s(t) + g –  ]dt
R5.3 Scenario 3 – Exponential Wage Growth
The estimates are obtained under the assumptions of Scenario 3 with the excep-
tion of a modified wage growth over the working life: s(t)   0 on  0, R . The indivi-
dual’s average real wage growth rate in this alternative scenario is 
1 ––  
R
0 [s(t) + g –  ] dt = g –   = 3 % (cf. 3.8 % for men and 3.4 % for women in the ori-
R
ginal scenario).
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TABLE 11 FF Replacement Ratios for Different Returns – Men
TABLE 12 FF Replacement Ratios for Different Returns – Women
TABLE 13 Comparison of Alternative Replacement Ratios
Rate of return:
Age 2 % 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8%
23 30.8 41.3 55.8 76.4 105.5 147.3 207.5
27 29.0 38.3 50.9 68.3 92.5 126.0 173.2
30 27.4 35.7 46.9 62.0 82.5 110.5 148.8
35 24.3 31.1 39.8 51.3 66.3 86.0 112.1
40 20.9 26.0 32.5 40.7 51.1 64.3 81.0
45 17.0 20.7 25.2 30.7 37.5 45.7 55.7
50 12.9 15.3 18.2 21.6 25.5 30.2 35.7
Rate of return:
Age 2 % 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8%
27 24.7 33.1 44.6 60.7 83.1 114.7 159.2
30 23.3 30.9 41.1 55.1 74.2 100.5 136.8
35 20.7 26.8 34.9 45.5 59.6 78.3 103.0
40 17.7 22.5 28.5 36.2 46.0 58.5 74.5
45 14.5 17.9 22.1 27.3 33.7 41.5 51.2
50 11.0 13.2 15.9 19.2 23.0 27.5 32.8
 FF (in %)  PAYG (in %) for those earning in 2005:
Age men women CZK 7,000 CZK 10,000 CZK 20,000 CZK 50,000
23 75.0 – 88.9 75.4 47.8 23.2
27 64.8 57.6 88.9 75.4 47.8 23.2
30 57.7 51.3 88.9 75.4 47.8 23.2
35 46.8 41.6 88.9 75.4 47.8 23.2
40 36.9 32.8 88.9 75.4 47.8 23.2
45 28.0 24.9 88.9 75.4 47.8 23.2
50 19.9 17.7 88.9 75.4 47.8 23.2REFERENCES
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AM icroanalysis of Pension Reform: To Switch 
or Not to Switch in the Czech Republic?
Michal JEŽEK – Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague 
(jezek@mbox.fsv.cuni.cz)
This paper examines the microeconomic impact of a reform of the Czech pension
system in which the program is partially shifted from a public, unfunded basis to
a private, funded basis. It considers three different scenarios in which individuals
have the choice to switch some of their mandatory contributions into afunded scheme
in exchange for a proportionate reduction in their traditional public pension bene-
fits. It attempts to discern, based on gender, age and income, which workers would
be better off switching, and offers some recommendations for policy makers. In par-
ticular, the impact of mandatory switching on individuals with low earning capaci-
ties is examined and discussed.
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